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To date, 38 men have been charged with terrorism offences in Australia. Twenty-six have 
been convicted. The article commences with an overview of the factual circumstances leading 
to these convictions. This provides important background for the following discussion of a 
largely unexplored issue in Australian anti-terrorism law and policy, namely, the difficulties 
faced by the Australian courts in adapting traditional sentencing principles to the (for the 
most part, preparatory) terrorism offences enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Of particular interest are how the courts determine the objective 
seriousness of these offences and the respective weight placed upon deterrence (both 
specific and general) and the rehabilitation of convicted terrorists. 
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Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Australia had no national anti-terrorism 
laws. A decade on, 54 such laws have been enacted by the Australian Parliament (Williams 
2011: 1144). These laws represent a significant deviation from the traditional reactionary 
approach of the criminal law. Instead, they aim to pre-empt the commission of terrorist acts in 
the first place. To this end, Australia’s anti-terrorism laws not only criminalise the commission 
of terrorist acts; they also establish a long list of preparatory, group-based and financing 
offences.  
 
The terrorism offences have been aggressively enforced. A senior counter-terrorism officer with 
the Australian Federal Police testified in October 2007 that this organisation was directed to ‘lay 
as many charges under the new terrorist legislation against as many suspects as possible 
because we wanted to use the new legislation’ (Neighbour 2007). Thirty-eight men, all but one 
of them Muslim, have been charged with terrorism offences in Australia to date. The charges 
against the men have resulted in 26 convictions (nine guilty pleas and seventeen convictions at 
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trial). The primary purpose of this article is not to analyse Australia’s terrorism trials. Instead, it 
will examine a largely unexplored issue in anti-terrorism law, that is, the principles relevant to 
the sentencing of convicted terrorists in Australia (see Pyne 2011; Diab 2011). It is, of course, 
impossible to examine this issue without some background. Therefore, this article will give a 
broad overview of the categories of terrorism offences in Australia and the cases against the 
convicted men.  
 
For the most part, the legislative framework for the sentencing of terrorism offences is identical 
to the framework for the sentencing of ‘ordinary’ criminals. A clear exception to this is the 
legislative requirement in s 19AG of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) that persons 
convicted of terrorism offences (with the exception of the association offence in s 102.8 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code)) be sentenced to no less than three-quarters of the 
head sentence. This has undoubtedly contributed to the significant length of terrorism 
sentences in Australia as compared with other countries such as Canada (Diab 2011: 275-277). 
This article will not discuss the issue of parole in any detail. Instead, it will examine how the 
Australian courts have considered and balanced competing sentencing principles in the anti-
terrorism context.  
 
Subsection 16A(1) of the Crimes Act codifies the common law principle of proportionality by 
providing that the sentence or order imposed by the court must be ‘of a severity appropriate in 
all the circumstances of the offence’ (Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 58 at [71]). This principle sets 
the upper limit of the sentence that may be imposed. However, in determining the precise 
sentence, the court must have reference to the non-exhaustive list of matters set out in subsec 
16A(2). These matters include: the nature and circumstances of the offence; any injury, loss or 
damage resulting from the offence; contrition shown by the convicted person for the offence; 
deterrent effect of the sentence; adequate punishment for the offence; and the prospect of 
rehabilitation. This is not a mathematical exercise. The court must take these matters into 
account only to the extent that they are known and, most importantly for current purposes, 
relevant. This draws our attention not only to the statutory framework but also to the way in 
which judges have exercised the discretion they are accorded within that framework.  
 
The starting point in sentencing anyone, terrorist or otherwise, must be to identify the ‘gravity 
of the offence viewed objectively’: ‘without this assessment the other factors requiring 
consideration in order to arrive at the proper sentence cannot properly be given their place’ (R v 
Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 249 at 354). This article will consider how the courts have determined 
the objective gravity of the new terrorism offences. It will then go on to consider one matter that 
has been given particular weight (deterrence) and one matter that has been largely ignored 
(rehabilitation) by the Australian courts in sentencing terrorists. This provides us with an 
insight, albeit an incomplete one, into the difficulties faced by Australian courts in adapting 
traditional sentencing principles to the anti-terrorism context and in balancing the various 
matters relevant to the sentencing exercise.  
 
Convictions of Australian terrorists2 
At the core of Australia’s anti-terrorism legislative framework is the offence of engaging in a 
terrorist act (s 101.1, Criminal Code). The definition of a ‘terrorist act’ in s 100.1 of the Criminal 
Code requires that the action be done or the threat of action made with the intention of 
advancing a ‘political, religious or ideological cause’ and of coercing an Australian or foreign 
government or intimidating the public. Furthermore, the action must cause a minimal level of 
harm, being serious physical harm, serious damage to property, a person’s death, the 
endangering of a person’s life, serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or serious 
interference with, disruption or destruction of an electronic system. There is an exception for 
advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action which is not intended to cause serious physical 
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harm or death, endanger a person’s life or create a serious risk to the health or safety of the 
public. 
 
Given the recent enactment of specific anti-terrorism legislation and Australia’s fortunate 
history of being relatively free from terrorist attacks, it is unsurprising that no one has thus far 
been charged with the offence of engaging in a terrorist act. Instead, the focus of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies has been upon the pre-emption of terrorist acts. To this 
end, Div 101 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to engage in preparatory conduct, 
including possessing a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4, Criminal 
Code) and doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.6, Criminal Code). Division 102 
makes it an offence to participate in a variety of ways in the activities of a declared terrorist 
organisation. For example, it is an offence to direct those activities (s 102.2, Criminal Code) and 
to train with (s 102.5, Criminal Code) or provide support or resources to (s 102.4, Criminal Code) 
a terrorist organisation. Division 102 also creates status offences for membership of (s 102.3, 
Criminal Code) and association with (s102.8, Criminal Code) a terrorist organisation. There are 
also two distinct regimes criminalising the financing of terrorism (Div 103, Criminal Code; 
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) (Charter Act)). 
 
As noted in the Introduction, 26 men have been convicted of terrorism offences in Australia. 
This section will briefly set out the factual background to these convictions and the sentences 
that were imposed. As many of the men were convicted of multiple offences, this section will 
discuss the convictions in chronological order (rather than by category of offence).  
 
Faheem Lodhi3 
In May 2003, Willie Brigitte, who was alleged to have trained at a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) camp 
in Pakistan, arrived in Australia from France. Lodhi met and collected Brigitte from Sydney 
International Airport. The trial judge, Whealy J, was not able to ascertain exactly what happened 
between Lodhi and Brigitte over the next few months; however, he was ‘satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that the relationship was not an innocent one’. In October 2003, the 
Australian authorities received a tip-off from their French counterparts and Brigitte was 
detained and deported. Six months later, in April 2004, Lodhi was arrested. 
 
At trial, Lodhi was acquitted of knowingly making a document connected with preparation for a 
terrorist act (s 101.5(1), Criminal Code), namely, aerial photos of Australian defence force 
establishments. He was, however, convicted of three other terrorism offences under Div 101 of 
the Criminal Code. First, knowingly possessing a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist 
act (s 101.4(1), Criminal Code), namely, a document in the Urdu language about how to make 
bombs. This offence carried a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and Lodhi was 
sentenced to 10 years. Second, knowingly collecting documents connected with preparation for 
a terrorist act (s 101.5(1), Criminal Code), namely, two maps of the electrical supply system in 
Sydney. The maximum penalty and the sentence imposed were the same as for the first offence. 
Finally, doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.6, Criminal Code), namely, seeking 
information about the availability of materials that could be used to make bombs. This offence 
carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and Lodhi was sentenced to 20 years. This 
sentence was to be served concurrently with the other two sentences of 10 years apiece.  
 
Belal Khazaal4 
A former Qantas baggage handler, Belal Khazaal, was charged in June 2004 with offences related 
to the writing of a book entitled Provisions on the Rules of Jihad – Short Wise Rules and 
Organisational Structures that Concern Every Fighter and Mujahid Fighting against the Infidels. 
This book was described by the prosecution as a ‘DIY terrorist manual’ (O’Brien 2008b). It 
outlined techniques for assassination, such as letter bombs and ‘cake-throwing’, a checklist for 
jihadist assassins and suggested possible targets, such as political and military leaders from 
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western democracies (O’Brien 2008a; Wilkinson 2005). The offences with which Khazaal was 
charged were, first, knowingly making a document in connection with preparation for a 
terrorist act (s 101.5(1), Criminal Code) and, second, attempting to incite others to commit the 
offence of engaging in a terrorist act in s 101.1 of the Criminal Code.  
 
Defence counsel argued that Khazaal was merely a journalist who had done no more than 
collect publicly available information and compile a reference book. However, this was belied by 
the publication of the book on an extremist website and the extensive editing done by Khazaal. 
In particular, he had dedicated the book to ‘all mujahedeen everywhere, all martyrs of Islam, 
prisoners languishing in the prisons of tyrants, be it infidels, apostates or hypocrites, Christians, 
Jews, or Infidels, idolater and apostate’ (O’Brien 2008c). Khazaal was convicted of the first 
offence. However, the prosecution was unable to prove to the satisfaction of the jury the mental 
element required for the second offence, namely, that the defendant intended to incite others to 
commit a terrorist act. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment (with a nine year non-
parole period).  
 
Operation Pendennis convictions5 
In November 2005, 13 men were arrested in raids in Melbourne and charged with a range of 
terrorism offences. These offences related to their participation in, and support of, an informal 
terrorist organisation based in Melbourne and led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika. The alleged 
purpose of this organisation was to engage in a holy jihad in order to persuade the then Howard 
government to withdraw Australian troops from Iraq. 
 
One of the charged men, Izydeen Atik, pled guilty  in July 2007 to knowingly being a member of 
a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1), Criminal Code) and knowingly providing support or 
resources – himself – to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1), Criminal Code). He subsequently 
provided evidence on behalf of the prosecution at the trial of the remaining 12 men. For the first 
offence, which carried a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, Atik was sentenced to five 
years imprisonment. At trial, seven of the remaining 12 men were also convicted of this offence. 
They were each sentenced to between four and five years imprisonment. Although the jury was 
unable to reach a verdict in relation to Shane Kent, he pled guilty after trial and received a 
sentence of four years and six months. For the second offence, which carried a maximum 
penalty of 25 years imprisonment, Atik was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Three 
other men were found guilty of this offence at trial and sentenced to either seven or eight years 
imprisonment.  
 
In addition to the above, a number of the men were convicted of further offences:  
 
• Benbrika was convicted of knowingly directing the activities of a terrorist organisation 
(s 102.2(1), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this offence was 25 years 
imprisonment and Benbrika was sentenced to 15 years;   
• Aimen Joud, Ahmed Raad and Ezzit Raad were convicted of attempting to knowingly 
make funds available to a terrorist organisation (ss 102.6(1) and 11.1, Criminal Code). 
The maximum penalty for this offence was 25 years and the men were sentenced to 
either four or five years imprisonment; 
• Benbrika and Joud were convicted of knowingly possessing a thing connected with 
preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4(1), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this 
offence was 15 years and Benbrika and Joud were each sentenced to five years; 
• Kent pleaded guilty to recklessly making a document connected with preparation for a 
terrorist act (s 101.5(2), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this offence was 10 
years and Kent was sentenced to two and a half years.  
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Operation Hammerli convictions6 
Also in November 2005, nine men were arrested in Sydney on charges related to those of the 
Operation Pendennis accused. They were each charged with conspiracy to do an act in 
preparation for a terrorist act (ss 11.5 and 101.6, Criminal Code). Five of the men were 
convicted at trial on the basis of a mosaic of circumstantial evidence, including attendance at 
training camps in Australia and overseas, making inquiries to purchase large quantities of 
chemicals, possession of ammunition, firearms, explosives, common possession of instructional 
and extremist material within the group, and use of code names and words. The offence carried 
a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the men were sentenced to between 23 and 28 
years.  
 
The remaining four men pleaded guilty to lesser offences prior to trial. These offences carried 
maximum penalties of between 10 years and life imprisonment. Mirsad Mulahalilovic pleaded 
guilty to the offence of recklessly possessing a thing (ammunition) connected with preparation 
for a terrorist act (s 101.4(2), Criminal Code). He was sentenced to four years and eight months 
imprisonment. Khaled Sharrouf pleaded guilty to the offence of knowingly possessing a thing 
(six clocks and 140 batteries) connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4(1), 
Criminal Code). He was sentenced to five years and three months imprisonment.  Mazen Touma 
also pleaded guilty to two counts of knowingly possessing a thing connected with preparation 
for a terrorist act (a collection of documents and other items including detonators and lengths 
of copper pipes) (s 101.4(1), Criminal Code). He was sentenced to eight years for each count. 
Touma also pleaded guilty to two counts of doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act 
(acquiring substantial quantities of ammunition and attempting to make explosive devices) (s 
101.6, Criminal Code). He was sentenced to fourteen years for each count. It is not clear what 
offences the final man, Omar Baladjam, pleaded guilty to. However, it has recently been revealed 
that Baladjam was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment (Jopson 2012). 
 
Tamil Tigers7 
In mid-2007, Arumugan Rajeevan, Aruran Vinayagamoorthy and Sivarajah Yathavan were 
charged with terrorist organisation offences, namely, knowingly being members of (s 102.3, 
Criminal Code), making funds available to (s 102.6(1), Criminal Code), and providing support or 
resources to a terrorist organisation (s 102.7(1), Criminal Code), and making an asset available 
to a proscribed entity contrary to s 21 of the Charter Act. The prosecution case was that the 
three men used the Melbourne-based Tamil Co-ordination Committee to raise monies – 
amounting to at least $700,000 – for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under the 
guise of fundraising for tsunami relief. The terrorist organisation charges were withdrawn in 
March 2009 probably because of difficulties faced by the prosecution in proving that the LTTE 
‘is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a 
terrorist act’ (Robinson 2007). This left only the offence under the Charter Act. At the time, this 
offence carried a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment (since increased to 10 years). 
The three men pleaded guilty in December 2009. Vinayagamoorthy pleaded guilty to two 
counts. He was sentenced to one year for the first count (providing electronic components) and 
18 months for the second (making monies available) but was released on a good behaviour 
bond of four years. Yathavan and Rajeevan pleaded guilty to one charge each of making monies 
available. They were sentenced to one year imprisonment apiece but, like Vinayagamoorthy, 
were released on a good behaviour bond of three years.  
 
Operation Neath convictions8 
Five men were arrested in August 2009 and charged with conspiracy to do an act in preparation 
for a terrorist act (ss 11.5 and 101.6, Criminal Code). It was alleged by the prosecution that they 
were planning to engage in a suicide attack upon Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney. Three of 
the men – Wissam Fattal, Saney Aweys and Nayef El Sayed – were convicted in December 2010. 
Fattal’s role in the conspiracy was to conduct preliminary reconnaissance at Holsworthy Army 
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Barracks, and he subsequently had a number of conversations with his close friend, El Sayed, 
about the ease with which an attack could be undertaken. Aweys, a Somali man and member of 
the same mosque as Fattal and El Sayed, contacted a sheikh in his home country to inquire as to 
whether it would be permissible to engage in a terrorist attack on an army barracks in Australia. 
The offence carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and each man was sentenced to 18 
years imprisonment. An appeal against conviction and sentence is pending (Iaria 2012).  
 
Objective seriousness of the offence 
Terrorism is universally acknowledged as being an extraordinary act of violence. As the Ontario 
Court of Appeal stated in R v Khawaja (2010) ONCA 862 at [231]:  
 
To be sure, terrorism is a crime unto itself. It has no equal. It does not stop at, nor 
is it limited to, the senseless destruction of people and property. It is far more 
insidious in that it attacks our very way of life and seeks to destroy the 
fundamental values to which we ascribe – values that form the essence of our 
constitutional democracy. 
 
There are two primary points of distinction between terrorism and ordinary criminal offences. 
First, a terrorist’s intention extends beyond the commission of an individual act of violence for a 
personal reason, such as revenge or money. The commission of a terrorist act is part of a more 
systematic and public agenda. To fall within the definition of a ‘terrorist act’, it is necessary that 
an individual intend to: (a) advance a political, religious and ideological cause; and (b) coerce or 
influence by intimidation an Australian or foreign government or the public. Pyne has pointed 
out that, although terrorist acts were committed and prosecuted in Australia well before the 
introduction of specific terrorism offences after 9/11, the courts ‘did not embark upon a lengthy 
examination of the ideology of the defendant’ in sentencing (Pyne 2011: 167). By contrast, the 
elements of the new terrorism offences now call upon sentencing courts to give particular 
attention to the offender’s public intention. In each Australian terrorism trial, the relevant 
intention has been identified as religious in nature, more specifically, to advance an Islamic 
jihadist cause. Sentencing courts have held a particularly dim view of such religious intentions, 
stating that ‘[t]he fanaticism that is demonstrated by the current terrorists is undoubtedly 
different in degree to that shown by sectarian terrorists [who] ... were not prepared to blow 
themselves up for their cause’ (R v Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 at [54] (Phillips LCJ)). 
Therefore, Pyne questions whether ‘we are singling out terrorism as outrageous and worthy of 
condign punishment not based on the dangerousness of an offender’s actual conduct, but 
because we disapprove of the ideas he or she holds’ (Pyne 2011: 172). The second distinction is 
that terrorist acts have the potential (and, in many cases, are intended) to endanger large 
sections of the community and cause mass loss of life. 
 
These two distinctions have led Australian courts to adopt, as their starting point, the idea that 
all terrorism-related offences are serious in nature and the sentences imposed must reflect this. 
Justice Whealy stated in Lodhi v R (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [91]-[92]: 
 
[T]he obligation of the Court is to denounce terrorism and voice its strong 
disapproval of activities such as those contemplated by the offender here. … In 
my view, the courts must speak firmly and with conviction in matters of this kind. 
This does not of course mean that general sentencing principles are undervalued 
or that matters favourable to an offender are to be overlooked. It does mean, 
however, that in offences of this kind, as I have said, the principles of 
denunciation and deterrence are to play a substantial role. 
 
This does not, however, explain how courts are to distinguish between different terrorism 
offences. This issue will be examined in the remainder of this section.  
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Maximum penalty 
Australia’s terrorism offences are deliberately expressed in broad language and cover a 
multitude of sins. For this reason, it is often possible to categorise preparatory acts as falling 
within several different offences. To take the example of a person providing $1,000 to the LTTE, 
this conduct could be prosecuted under: (a) s 101.6 of the Criminal Code (doing an act in 
preparation for a terrorist act); (b) s 102.6 (providing funds to a terrorist organisation); (c) any 
of the four specific financing offences in Div 103; or (d) s 21 of the Charter Act (giving an asset to 
a proscribed entity). Given the considerable overlap in the substantive content of these offences, 
it is striking that the maximum penalties differ significantly from offence to offence. The offence 
of doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act carries a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment. In contrast, the Charter Act offence carries a maximum penalty of only ten years 
imprisonment.  
 
The High Court has repeatedly stated that sentencing judges should take into account the 
legislated maximum penalty in determining what sentence to impose. For example, in 
Markarian v R (2005) 79 ALJR 1048 at [31], the High Court stated: 
 
[C]areful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first 
because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite 
comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the 
time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced 
with all other factors, a yardstick. 
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that prosecutors have generally chosen to rely upon those offences 
that carry the greatest maximum penalty. This increases the possibility that a lengthy period of 
imprisonment will be imposed after conviction (R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [69]). The 
three most recent terrorism trials, Operation Hammerli, Operation Neath and the aborted 
Operation Pendennis No. 2, have each involved prosecutions for conspiring to do an act in 
preparation for a terrorist act (ss 11.5 and 101.6, Criminal Code). The third of these trials was 
permanently stayed as an abuse of process in 2011 (R v Benbrika and Ors [2011] VSC 342 at 
[2]). As noted above, this offence carries the same maximum penalty as does the offence of 
actually engaging in a terrorist act, namely, life imprisonment. In R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 
681 at [3], Justice King stated that a person convicted of this offence would almost certainly 
receive a lengthy sentence: 
 
The offence, of which you have all been convicted, carries a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment, which is an indicator of the seriousness with which Parliament 
views offending of this type. Other offences that come within the category of life 
imprisonment include matters such as murder, treason and some large 
commercial quantities of trafficking and importing of drugs. 
 
Nature of the planned terrorist act 
Selection of a terrorist target 
All of Australia’s terrorism trials have involved preparatory offences. The extent to which 
sentencing judges should take into account the planned terrorist act, as opposed to 
concentrating upon the acts taken in preparation, is a vexed issue. In Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 
360 at [230], Spigelman CJ (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Sully J agreed) stated that ‘an 
evaluation of criminal culpability required analysis not only of the [preparatory] act itself but an 
examination of the nature of the terrorist act contemplated particularly in the light of the 
appellant’s intentions or state of mind’.  
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The problem with this approach is that the early intervention by law enforcement agencies 
often means that convicted terrorists will not yet have selected a particular target. As Spigelman 
CJ stated in Lodhi v R (2006) 199 FLR 303 at [65]-[66]: 
 
Each of the offence sections is directed to the preliminary steps for actions which 
may have one or more effects. By their very nature, specific targets or particular 
effects will not necessarily, indeed not usually, have been determined at such a 
stage. ... It was, in my opinion, the clear intention of Parliament to create offences 
where an offender has not decided precisely what he or she intends to do. 
 
The only case in which the prosecution specified a terrorist target in the indictment was that of 
Operation Neath. In addition to evidence of Fattal’s preliminary reconnaissance at Holsworthy 
Army Barracks, the prosecution relied upon an intercepted telephone conversation between 
Aweys and a Somali sheik on 10 July 2009. Aweys said to the sheik that ‘they want to enter into 
the military forces are stationed, the barracks. Their desire is to fan out as much as they could 
until they would be hit’ (Munro 2010). In sentencing the three men in R v Fattal and Ors [2011] 
VSC 681 at [5], King J described the planned terrorist attack in the following terms:  
 
The Crown case was that you three, together with others, were preparing and 
planning for an attack on the Holsworthy Army Base in New South Wales. It was 
to be carried out by possibly six persons, who may or may not have included each 
of you. The attack was to be with guns, and the basic plan was to enter the army 
base and using the guns that had been obtained, to then shoot as many persons 
on the base as could be shot before each of those persons attacking were 
themselves killed. … That is the decision that the jury gave. 
 
It is not possible to calculate, in a mathematical sense, exactly how much of the 18 year sentence 
was attributable to the nature of the planned terrorist attack. However, the ‘evil’ nature of this 
plan and the ‘horrific’ consequences if the planned terrorist attack had eventuated were 
mentioned by King J as relevant factors in sentencing (R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 at 
[85]).  
 
The sentencing of the Operation Pendennis terrorists also provides some guidance as to the 
impact that the selection of a target might have upon the sentence imposed. Atik testified at trial 
that Benbrika had honed in on several terrorist targets. These were the Melbourne Cricket 
Ground during the AFL or NAB Cup Grand Finals or the Crown Casino on Grand Prix weekend (R 
v Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [39]). For the purposes of sentencing, Whealy J refused to 
rely upon this evidence. His Honour concluded that ‘much of the material [Atik] provided to the 
police, before he was sentenced, including his account of the targets conversation with Benbrika 
was untrue and designed purely to serve his own ends’. However, his Honour stated in R v 
Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [46] that:  
 
Had Atik’s evidence as to the proposed targets been accepted, and had knowledge 
of those targets been proved against the prisoners other than Benbrika, their 
criminality in belonging to the terrorist organisation would have been 
commensurately greater than has been proved without Atik’s evidence. 
 
Intended harm 
More commonly, the prosecution has been forced to limit itself to evidence about the nature of 
the harm that the planned terrorist act is intended to cause. The range of harms captured by the 
Australian definition of a ‘terrorist act’ in s 100.1(2) of the Criminal Code is broad. At the least 
serious end is causing serious damage to property or seriously interfering with, disrupting or 
destroying an electronic infrastructure. At the most grave end is causing serious physical harm 
to a person or a person’s death. In the United Kingdom case of R v Byrne (1975) 62 Cr App R 159 
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at 163, the Court held that ‘[c]learly conduct which is likely to endanger life is more grave than 
conduct which is likely to cause serious injury to property’. However, in many cases, an 
assessment of the harm intended to be caused by convicted terrorists is not as black and white 
as this comment suggests. This confusion is apparent in Whealy J’s sentencing of both Lodhi and 
the Operation Hammerli terrorists. In each case, his Honour stated that the intention of the men 
was, at the very least, to cause serious damage to property. It had not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the definite intention of the offenders was to cause serious physical harm 
to other persons. However, the fact that they intended to use explosives to commit an act of 
violence, combined with their extremist mindset, meant that they must at the very least have 
‘contemplated’ (R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [36]) or ‘countenanced’ (R v Elomar and Ors 
[2010] NSWSC 10 at [60]) the causing of physical harm. For this reason, Whealy J accepted in 
each case that the offences fell ‘only marginally short of the most serious case’ (R v Elomar and 
Ors [2010] NSWSC 10 at [69]; R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [46]-[48]).  
 
Proximity 
An examination of the planned terrorist act – or at least the harm likely to be caused by that act 
– cannot be the sole factor relied upon by Australian courts to determine the objective 
seriousness of an offence. If that were the case, a terrorist who had only engaged in very 
preliminary activities would be subject to the same penalties as a terrorist who had successfully 
carried out a terrorist act. To mitigate this problem, it might be possible for the courts to take 
into account the proximity between the preparatory acts and the commission of a terrorist act. 
This would ‘ensure that the sentence is based on what the offender actually did, not what he or 
she might have done’ (Pyne 2011: 173).  
 
An examination of proximity would also be consistent with the approach taken to sentencing for 
the traditional inchoate offences of attempt and conspiracy. For example, in relation to 
sentencing for conspiracy, ‘any considerations which advert to the content and duration and 
reality of the conspiracy are to be taken into account’ (R v Kane (1975) VR 658 at 661 (Gowans J, 
with whom McInerney and Nelson JJ agreed)). However, in Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360 at 
[229], the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal pointed out that ‘[t]he proximity between 
the criminal act and the commission of the substantive offence is necessarily more remote’ for 
the preparatory terrorism offences. This is because in enacting the preparatory terrorism 
offences in Division 101, the Australian Parliament made a deliberate decision to ‘enable 
intervention by law enforcement agencies to prevent a terrorist act at a much earlier time than 
would be the case if they were required to wait for the commission of the planned offence or for 
an unsuccessful attempt to commit it’ (Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360 at [229]). If sentences 
were downgraded as a result of the preparatory acts being distant from the commission of a 
terrorist act, a consequence may be that law enforcement agencies would delay arrests until 
more evidence is available. This would undermine the pre-emptive purpose of the legislative 
scheme. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeal continued in Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360 at 
[229]:  
 
[Proximity] does not determine the objective seriousness of such an offence. It 
does not follow that as long as the preparatory acts relied upon to constitute the 
offences are in their infancy criminal culpability must necessarily be low. The 
main focus of the assessment of objective seriousness must be the offender’s 
conduct and the offender’s intention at the time the crime was committed. 
 
In light of the sentencing of Lodhi, Pyne concluded that the courts were reluctant ‘to mitigate 
penalties for the new terrorism offences because the impugned conduct is far removed from any 
actual terrorist act’ (Pyne 2011: 172). This is not entirely correct. It is true that the courts do not 
regard proximity as a determinative factor. Nevertheless, it is a ‘relevant’ factor (Lodhi v R 
[2007] NSWCCA 360 at [229]). At first instance in the Lodhi trial, Whealy J regarded the making 
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of inquiries about chemicals as the most serious of the three offences because this ‘brought him 
that much closer to the carrying out of an act of terror than did the other preliminary actions for 
which he has been convicted’ (R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [69]). His Honour adopted the 
same approach in sentencing the Operation Hammerli terrorists in R v Elomar and Ors [2010] 
NSWSC 10 at [68]:  
 
[T]he conspiracy was advanced to such an extent that it could not be said its 
outcome was remote. … The materials were to hand and recipes for the 
construction of explosives were available. It certainly could not be said that the 
prospect of a terrorist act or acts was completely indeterminate as to when it 
would occur. 
 
A comparison of the latter sentencing judgment with that of King J in sentencing the Operation 
Neath terrorists in R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 reveals how the progress made towards 
the commission of a terrorist act may affect the sentence. Justice King concluded that the plan of 
the Operation Neath terrorists was ‘not attenuated with all of the steps that have been taken by 
those involved in [the Operation Hammerli trial, including stockpiling weapons and explosive 
material and engaging in training camps] and, accordingly, in my view does not warrant 
sentences of a level approximating those [sentences]’ (at [96]). The plan of the Operation Neath 
terrorists had ‘not advance[d] to any significant degree’ (at [87]). For example, Fattal’s visit to 
Holsworthy Army Barracks was ‘[i]n terms of preparation or planning ... of little or no use’ (at 
[91].). He had no writing materials or camera to record what he saw at the barracks and, in 
walking only to the first gate, would have obtained very little information about the level of 
protection of the barracks.  
 
Assuming that proximity is a relevant factor, the next question is how exactly the courts are to 
calculate this. It is obvious that they must consider the number and nature of the particular 
preparatory acts and the period of time over which they were committed. In R v Elomar and Ors 
[2010] NSWSC 10, Whealy J took into account two other matters in sentencing the Operation 
Hammerli terrorists. First, the convicted men carried out their tasks in clear defiance of the 
authorities. They did not cease their activities upon the authorities becoming suspicious, but 
rather moved them underground (at [64]). Therefore, ‘there is no reason to doubt that, absent 
the intervention of the authorities, the plan might well have come to fruition in early 2006 or 
thereabouts’ (at [68]). The second matter was the strength of their shared extremist mindset. 
This mindset was characterised by a hatred of non-believers, intolerance towards the Australian 
government and its policies, and a conviction that Muslims were obligated to pursue violent 
jihad so as to overthrow liberal, democratic societies and replace them with Sharia law (at [63]). 
His Honour concluded in relation to this mindset that: 
 
The driving fanaticism behind the collective mindset of the conspiracy would 
have ensured that events moved quickly once sufficient material had been 
assembled, and the authorities’ surveillance thwarted or at least diminished (at 
[68]). 
 
Yet another matter that emerges from the case law is the sophistication or amateurish nature of 
the plan. In other words, the practical likelihood that the convicted men would have, without the 
intervention of the authorities, committed the planned terrorist act. In Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A 
Crim R 470 at 530, Price J said that ‘[t]he inter-relationship between the seriousness of the 
intended consequences and the real prospects of achieving them is a factor to be weighed in the 
light of all the circumstances’. Similarly, in sentencing the Operation Neath terrorists in R v 
Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 at [87], King J said that ‘by far, the most ameliorating factor that 
you have, is the amateurish level at which you were all operating’. However, in sentencing other 
convicted terrorists, judges have raised serious doubts about whether much weight should be 
given to this factor. This is because even an amateurish plan is capable of causing considerable 
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damage and even death (R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [54]; R v Elomar and Ors [2010] 
NSWSC 10 at [68]). As pointed out by Bongiorno J in R v Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [67], 
‘terrorist acts as they have been experienced in modern times are often carried out by amateurs 
whose principal attribute has not been skill but rather a zealous or fanatical belief in some 
ideology or other which seeks to promote itself by the use of violence’. Therefore, this third 
matter should be treated with caution by sentencing courts.  
 
Group-based offences 
Sentencing courts have indicated that it is appropriate when sentencing for a group-based 
offence, whether a terrorist organisation offence in Div 102 of the Criminal Code or a conspiracy 
charge, to consider the nature and history of the informal group or official organisation. The 
Victorian Court of Appeal in Benbrika and Ors v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [555] drew a distinction 
between a group consisting of a ‘rag-tag collection of malcontents’ and an organisation, such as 
Al Qaeda, ‘with a proven record of committing the worst terrorists acts imaginable’. Whilst any 
activities engaged in with the intention of advancing the commission of a terrorist act cannot ‘be 
regarded as less than very serious’ (at [557]), nevertheless ‘the activities of the former class of 
organisation are less likely to result in the commission of a terrorist act than the latter’ (at 
[555]). Furthermore, the moral culpability of an individual who becomes involved with an 
organisation of the latter class is likely to be greater because ‘logic and common sense imply the 
probability that the offender will be committed to the terrorist philosophy and objectives of the 
organisation before being admitted to its membership, and so they will go into it with their eyes 
wide open’ (at [556]). Therefore, the nature of the organisation is a factor that should be taken 
into account by a sentencing judge in deciding what range of sentence to impose.  
 
In R v Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [235], Bongiorno stated that the seriousness of the 
terrorist organisation offences, and especially the membership offence, are ‘principally 
dependent upon what the objectives of the organisation are, its capacity and how it intends to 
achieve those objectives’. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each of the members of a 
terrorist organisation has the same level of criminal culpability. Another factor at sentencing is 
the particular role played by each individual in the activities of the organisation. At one end of 
the spectrum was Benbrika: 
 
The essence of Benbrika’s criminality, ... lies in his exercising an enormous 
influence over the young men who followed him, and imbuing, or seeking to 
imbue in them, a fanatical hatred of non-Muslims and, even, those vast majority 
of Muslims who abhor violence as much as anyone else. The degree of his 
criminality, both with respect to his membership and direction of the 
organisation, must be judged in light of the fact that the existence of the 
organisation and his leadership of it created a significant risk that a terrorist act 
would be committed in this community (at [68]). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum was the youngest member of the group, Abdullah Merhi. The 
Victorian Court of Appeal found in Benbrika and Ors v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [582] that his role 
in the organisation, and thus the objective seriousness of his offending, was significantly less 
than that of the other convicted men. 
 
The role of deterrence 
Subsection 16A(2) of the Crimes Act explicitly requires that specific deterrence be taken into 
account in sentencing. Specific deterrence aims to dissuade the individual offender from 
committing further offences of a similar nature by imposing sanctions which demonstrate the 
adverse consequences of criminal activity. Courts have, however, struggled with the issue of 
whether convicted terrorists will actually be deterred by the imposition of harsh sentences (see, 
for example Whealy 2010: 35). The Court of Appeal for England and Wales in R v Barot [2007] 
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EWCA Crim 1119 explained why deterrence may be ineffective in the anti-terrorism context. It 
stated at [45] that: 
 
Terrorists who set out to murder innocent citizens are motivated by perverted 
ideology. Many are unlikely to be deterred by the length of the sentence that they 
risk, however long this may be. Indeed, some are prepared to kill themselves in 
order to more readily kill others.  
 
Harsh sentences will almost certainly not deter someone who is willing and plans to kill 
themself in the course of committing a terrorist act. The so-called ‘Underwear Bomber,’ for 
example, pled guilty in October 2011 to attempting to blow himself up on a trans-Atlantic 
airliner, and referred to the bomb as ‘a blessed weapon to save the lives of innocent Muslims’ 
(Oberman 2011).  
 
However, it is important to remember that not all terrorists are suicide bombers. As Whealy J 
has rightly pointed out in an extra-judicial comment, ‘terrorists cannot adequately function 
without followers, acolytes or assistants’ (Whealy 2010: 34.). The factual circumstances 
underlying the conviction of terrorists in Australia demonstrate that the terrorism offences 
cover a broad spectrum of offenders. Therefore, specific deterrence will be most relevant as a 
sentencing factor when an individual has merely been reckless or has committed a terrorism 
offence of a lower order. The latter might include ‘people who simply have sympathies for the 
activities of an organisation like the LTTE, or who are willing to have them benefit from 
fundraising efforts even though there is in addition a humanitarian goal to those efforts’ (R v 
Thambaithurai [2010] BCSC 1949 at [19]).  
 
In any event, even where the convicted terrorist is unlikely to be deterred from future acts, this 
does not mean that general deterrence should not be considered. In contrast to specific 
deterrence, general deterrence is not mentioned in s 16A(2). Nevertheless, the proportionality 
test spelt out in s 16A(1), as well as the continuing relevance of common law sentencing 
principles, mean that general deterrence will still be taken into account by a court in sentencing 
an individual for a federal offence (DPP v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370). General deterrence 
is not aimed at the specific individual, but rather seeks to deter prospective offenders by 
instilling in them the fear of incurring similar sanctions. This has a particular importance in the 
anti-terrorism context because of the emphasis on pre-empting terrorist attacks rather than 
punishing them after the fact. Once again, we must keep in mind that not all those in the 
community who might commit a terrorist act are fanatics whom it is impossible to deter. As the 
Court of Appeal explained in R v Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 at [45]: 
 
It is … important that those who might be tempted to accept the role of camp 
followers of the more fanatic, are aware that, if they yield to that temptation, they 
place themselves at risk of very severe punishment. 
 
In both judicial and extra-judicial commentary, Whealy J has expressed a personal view that 
heavy sentences ‘probably do not’ deter individuals from committing terrorist acts (Whealy 
2010: 36). In fact, his Honour has suggested that not only may sentences be ineffective as a 
deterrent but ‘there is some danger that the imposition of stern sentences, no matter that is may 
be completely justified, has the capacity to inflame resentment and may encourage young 
Muslim men into an extremist position’ (Whealy 2010: 36). This is supported by Pyne, who 
states that ‘[l]engthy imprisonment may be counterproductive when, in the case of suicide 
bombers, they perceive that they have no option but death or life in prison’ (Pyne 2011: 178). 
Nevertheless, in R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [92], Whealy J argues that ‘the court’s duty is 
nevertheless a duty to denounce serious criminality’ and ‘a stand must be taken’: 
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The community is owed this protection even if the obstinacy and madness of 
extreme views may mean that the protection is a fragile or uncertain one. … 
There is also a need to recognise that the imposition of a substantial sentence 
may have a personal impact as a deterrent on this offender so that upon his 
release he will, it is cautiously hoped, be unlikely or less likely to re-offend. In 
addition to general deterrence, the need to deter this man from future offences is 
a potent factor in the sentencing process. 
 
Prospects of rehabilitation 
The final issue that this article seeks to address is the extent to which sentencing courts have 
taken into account an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. That is, the likelihood that the 
values of the offender can be changed and he or she returned to the community as a law-abiding 
citizen. The standard approach taken in both Australian and foreign terrorism trials seems to be 
that rehabilitation is (at most) a subsidiary factor at sentencing (R v Martin [1998] EWCA Crim 
3046 at [480]; Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360 at [274] (Price J); R v Khawaja [2010] ONCA 862 
at [201]; Pyne 2011: 177-178). This approach is not particularly surprising. It reflects the trend 
over the last decade or two for courts to downplay the relevance of rehabilitation to the 
sentencing process, especially where the offence is serious (Edney and Bagaric 2007: 66). 
Further, it is consistent with the emphasis placed by the courts on the ‘immutable’ (R v 
Thambaithurai [2011] BCCA 137 at [22]), ‘inflexible’ and ‘intransigent’ (R v Elomar and Ors 
[2010] NSWSC 10 at [63]) extremist beliefs motivating someone to commit or prepare to 
commit a terrorist act. In R v Elomar and Ors [2010] NSWSC 10 at [63], Whealy J stated:  
 
This criminal enterprise was not in any sense motivated, as criminal activities so 
often are, by a need for financial gain or simply private revenge. Rather, an 
intolerant and inflexible fundamentalist religious conviction was the principal 
feature for the commission of the offence. This is the most startling and 
intransigent feature of the crime. It sets it apart from other criminal enterprises 
motivated by financial gain, by passion, anger or revenge. 
 
The assumption underlying comments such as this is that terrorists cannot be rehabilitated. Or, 
at least, the very slight chance that they may be rehabilitated does not justify the risk to the 
community of releasing them earlier than would otherwise have been appropriate. Whether this 
assumption is correct is an open question. At last count, 13 convicted terrorists had been 
released (eight of the nine Pendennis terrorists; two of the nine convicted Operation Hammerli 
terrorists; and the three Tamil Tigers) (Jopson 2012). The short period of time these men have 
been in the community since their release means that it is not possible to determine whether 
they have in fact been rehabilitated or will reoffend. However, studies conducted overseas 
reveal that the prospects of rehabilitation may not be as dim as suggested by the Australian 
courts. In Saudi Arabia, for example, it is claimed that rehabilitation programs established for 
Guantanamo Bay detainees have had a success rate of 80 to 90 percent (Seifer 2010; see also, 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 2010: 47-58). 
Singapore’s rehabilitation programs have also achieved considerable success, with two thirds of 
detained individuals being released after, on average, only four years detention (Roach 2011: 
140-142). These rehabilitation programs, as with those in other countries, have concentrated 
upon religious re-education. The underlying assumption is that those who engage in terrorism 
are motivated by misinformation about the tenets of Islam and its attitude towards violence.  
 
In R v Khawaja [2010] ONCA 862 at [200], the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the absence of 
any evidence of remorse on the part of the offender or that he no longer subscribes to violent 
jihad is not merely ‘a neutral factor’ in sentencing. It ‘should [be] treated as a significant 
indicator of his present and future dangerousness’. This approach is extremely problematic as it 
seems to undermine the accepted approach that the prosecution bears the onus of proving 
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aggravating factors at sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt (R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; 
see also Edney and Bagaric 2007: 142-145). Fortunately, the more traditional approach to the 
identification of aggravating factors was demonstrated by Whealy J in R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 
1475 at [146]:  
 
At the very least, it can be said, in the present matter, that I am by no means 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender has refused to budge from 
his former extremist view. 
 
It continues to be the case in Australia that an absence of evidence that a person has moved 
away from their extremist views is a neutral (and not an aggravating) factor at sentencing. This 
does not answer, however, the critical question of what evidence the Australian courts will 
require to be satisfied that a person has good prospects of rehabilitation.  
 
In sentencing the Operation Hammerli terrorists who had pled guilty prior to trial, Whealy J 
found that their guilty pleas could be taken, to a degree, ‘to express remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility’, as well as ‘a drawing back by the offender from the extremist views that 
motivated the commission of the offences’ (R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 at [144]). In R v 
Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002 at [49], Whealy J accepted that overall ‘the offender has 
reasonable prospects of rehabilitation’. Similarly, in R v Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010 at 
[70], Whealy J stated that ‘the plea must be taken to indicate that the offender is unlikely to be, 
or represent, a danger to the community on release’. Far less weight has, however, been given to 
statements made by convicted terrorists to psychologists or other persons to the effect that they 
had renounced their extremist views. Justice Whealy noted in R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 at 
[144] that ‘considerable caution’ must be taken in judging the prospects of rehabilitation and 
whether there has in fact been a movement away from extremist views because ‘the present 
state of [the defendant’s] mind has not been explored or tested in any way’ (see also R v Lodhi 
(2006) 199 FLR 364 [74]). In other words, the offenders had not given evidence at the 
sentencing hearing and therefore the prosecution was unable to cross-examine them as to their 
current mindset. 
 
The sentencing of the Operation Neath terrorists also provides some insight on this point. 
Justice King noted in R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 at [60]-[61] that evidence had been 
given by an Islamic chaplain who had been providing religious education to Aweys since his 
incarceration in August 2009. The chaplain said that he had observed significant changes in 
Aweys’ attitude towards the use of violence in the name of Islam. However, King J did not regard 
this evidence as being of any weight on the question of rehabilitation, saying that it fell well 
short of evidencing that Aweys no longer held extremist views. Her Honour instead focused at 
[82]-[83] on the fact that:  
 
None of you, not one, gave instructions to his counsel to say to this court, that you 
recanted from any extremist view that you held. That you no longer supported 
jihad, or terrorism, as being appropriate for pursuing the course of the Muslim 
faith. That is a significant factor because, each of you, whilst you hold those views 
remains a danger to the members of this community, and thus, protection of the 
community remains a very significant factor in sentencing you, as does personal 
deterrence.  
 
Even if such instructions were given, it is questionable whether they would be regarded as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing. It would be understandable for the sentencing judge to have 
serious doubts about the self-serving nature of this evidence.  
 
Finally, in R v Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [117], Bongiorno J noted that the age of an 
offender ‘is relevant to the possibility of his rehabilitation’. Some guidance on this point might 
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be taken from the Canadian courts. In that jurisdiction, it has been held that the relevance of an 
offender’s youth is not ‘obliterated’ because he or she has been convicted of a terrorism offence 
(R v Gaya (2010) ONSC 434 at [64]). Nevertheless, the youth of an offender should be given less 
weight in the anti-terrorism context than in sentencing other serious criminal offenders. This is, 
first, because of the general rule that the more serious the offence, the less weight the youth of 
an offender should be given. As noted in R v Khawaja [2010] ONCA 862 at [43], ‘short of actually 
committing mass murder, the [crime of terrorism] ranks extremely high on the scale of serious 
offenders’. Second, ‘[a]nother reason for taking a more punitive approach to useful first 
offenders who might be tempted to commit terrorist crimes is to let them know, in clear terms, 
that their youth and lack of criminal antecedents will count for little in ameliorating the severity 
of their sentences’ (at [46]). Third, their impressionability and prior good character means that 
‘[y]outhful first offenders present as attractive recruits to sophisticated terrorists’ (at [47]). It is 
therefore critical to hand down harsh sentences to this vulnerable group in order to warn them 
away from being involved in terrorism. Finally, the extremist mindset of terrorists means that it 




Despite the limited jurisprudence in the anti-terrorism context, Australian courts have been 
quick to develop principles to be applied to the sentencing of convicted terrorists. The precise 
content of these principles is, in some cases, still unclear. However, three points may be derived 
from the jurisprudence.  
 
First, the overwhelming determinant of the sentence handed down in a terrorism case is the 
objective seriousness of the offence. The starting point has been that all terrorism offences are 
serious. The maximum penalty set out in the legislation also provides some guidance. The courts 
will also, if the information is available, take into account the target of the planned terrorist act, 
the damage that the terrorists intend to cause and the proximity between the preparatory acts 
and the commission of a terrorist act.  
 
Second, sentences imposed in respect of convicted terrorists are likely to be lengthy. This will be 
especially so where they have been convicted of conspiracy to do an act in preparation for a 
terrorist act. For such offences, Australian courts have handed down sentences of between 18 
and 28 years. This presents a sharp contrast to the sentences handed down for comparable 
conduct where the charges were laid under other sections in Div 101 or under Div 102. Because 
of this there is a very strong possibility that, in the future, prosecutors will decide to charge 
persons with this offence rather than the other (less serious) terrorism offences in Divs 101 and 
102 of the Criminal Code.  
 
Third, factors that are typically taken into account during the sentencing process assume a 
secondary importance in the anti-terrorism context. These factors include the convicted 
person’s age, family situation, employment history and criminal record. In R v Lodhi (2006) 199 
FLR 364, Whealy J identified a number of features of Lodhi’s life and circumstances that were in 
his favour. However, far from relying upon these factors to mitigate his sentence, Whealy J 
stated that these factors ‘make it difficult to understand why a young man of excellent personal 
background, with a considerable professional work ethic, would have contemplated carrying 
out the very serious criminal actions that have brought him to his present position in these 
proceedings’ (at 377). Most significantly, Australian courts have taken the view that the 
extremist views of terrorists mean that their prospects of rehabilitation are negligible at best. It 
is only where the convicted person pleads guilty that the courts have been willing to accept that 
he has moved away from those extremist views. As Price J stated in Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 
360 at [274]: 
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Rehabilitation and personal circumstances should often be given very little 
weight in the case of an offender who is charged with a terrorism offence. A 
terrorism offence is an outrageous offence and greater weight is to be given to 
the protection of society, personal and general deterrence and retribution. 
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